CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW Application: ARAMIS RTF Descriptor: CoveringPM: CovDescriptor: CovCaveat: Finalised: OfficialRecord: DocumentStatus: Registered CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER DocumentStyle: MINUTE/SUBMISSION ProtectiveMarking: CONFIDENTIAL Caveat: FromInd: FromOrg: ToInd: ToOrg: DocumentDate: 15/01/2000 RegisteredOn: 15/01/2000 SysDocumentDate: 15/01/2000 Subject: MEETING OF THE WHITEHALL PMC GROUP: 16 NOVEMBER 1999 Draft: ARAMIS folder reference: UNG332/001/99 FolderReference: UNG332/001/1999 AdditionalText: RegisteredBy: und17 DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE STARTDOCUMENT: .RE Changed to FINAL by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:55 [.RE1][.RE2][.RE3][.RE4][.RE5][.RE6][.RE7][.RE8][.RE9]MEETING OF THE WHITEHALL PMC GROUP: 16 NOVEMBER 1999 1. The second meeting of the Whitehall PMC Group was held on 16 November 1999. At the outset, the draft record of the previous meeting was amended and agreed, and draft terms of reference for the PMC Group were discussed, amended and agreed. There was agreement that all departments would nominate two representatives, and would notify Sanctions Unit, FCO, in the event that neither was able to attend the monthly meeting of the Group. All representatives must have a minimum of STRAP 2 security clearance. There was agreement that the role of the Group should be to address the activities of private military companies as a whole, which can potentially undermine HMG's policy objectives in a number of ways. The focus should not be limited to mercenary activity. Sources of Information 2. Dr Wyver noted that the PMC Group could draw on a wide range of information, including the media, Sigint and information from the agencies. Mr Totty noted that Desk Officers would be able to turn to the group for advice and would pass on to it, in return, any relevant information from Posts. Legal Constraints 3. Ms Hebden noted the legal constraints on what the Security Service could record. There was a risk that inaccurate information would be recorded in the database. This was an area of cut-throat commercial competition, and companies could well spread damaging rumours about each other. The Group agreed that when information was entered, the originator should be made clear, with an indication of whether or not the allegations could be verified. 4. Mr Andrews noted that intelligence from the agencies could never, in any case, be quoted. The information on the database was not intended for public use. It would simply be fed into the normal analytical process. However, legal advice would certainly need to be taken on the implications of the Data Protection Act. It would be easier if one of the agencies could sponsor the database, to bring it under the Intelligence Services Act. Ms Hebden said this would not/not be possible. Mr Heard noted that the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law was affecting the way that GCHQ could store information. An initial steer from lawyers on the legal admissibility of such a database would be essential. Mr Sanbrook noted that a clear guarantee would be needed that the consent of the originator would be sought before documents were disclosed in court. Court cases would have to be dropped if potential evidence could not be disclosed to the defence team. A defendant might also plausibly argue that the Government had tacitly approved their activities if information on them had been stored on the database but no action taken. Parameters of the Database 5. Ms Butler asked whether an unofficial database existed already. Mr Andrews said that for historical reasons DIS maintained a small database on PMCs in Africa. But they had not previously stored information on the human rights record of PMCs. Mr Darling said that the current situation was unsatisfactory. There was a failure of joined-up government; Departments were not pooling their knowledge. 6. Mr Andrews noted that the software for a very effective database was already in place. But for it to operate effectively, other Departments would need to commit to automatically providing all available information. Taking the existing Africa database as a starting point, he proposed to input automatically the last 10 years of GCHQ reporting on the subject and the last 2 years of CX material, indicating the originator. He asked for permission to automatically copy all relevant FCO telegrams into the system from now on. (Dr Wyver agreed to seek FCO consent.) Information from the media could also be included. The database would be strictly UK EYES ONLY, and would only be accessible on behalf of officials with at least STRAP 2 security clearance. Requests for information would be made to the relevant DIS desk officer. These requests, and any response, would ideally be transmitted via the UKIMN/X400 system. But not all interested departments currently have this installed. The problem of access therefore requires further thought. 7. All participating Departments would need to: (i) consult their legal advisers on the database proposal; (ii) obtain ministerial approval to participate in the project; (iii) commit themselves in writing to sharing information on PMC activities; 8. Mr Sanbrook noted that HMC & E would not/not be able to provide information for the database on activities of PMCs which are not illegal in the UK. They could only make use of their statutory powers to seek information from companies for specified purposes, eg securing Excise Duties and VAT. 9. It was agreed that the database should cover UK-registered PMCs, PMCs employing UK citizens and PMCs with a UK base. There should be a special emphasis on PMCs operating in Africa. UND should ask the JIC to include a generic requirement to report on the activity of PMCs in these categories. Mr Andrews noted that the agencies could not be tasked to look at the activities of companies registered in the territory of intelligence allies, eg the US. Nor would it deal with the activities of security sector companies who operated purely in the UK, or at companies who merely provided armed guarding services. What we were targeting were the providers of military services. Interaction with the REU and the Sanctions Information Groups 10. Ms Gilhespy noted that the REU was responsible for addressing PMC activity where illegal arms proliferation was concerned. She would bring to its attention any relevant information from the PMC Group. Dr Wyver undertook to ensure that allegations of non-military sanctions busting by PMCs were brought to the attention of the Iraq Sanctions Information Group (SIG) and the Rest of the World SIG, also chaired by UND. HMG contacts with private security/military companies 11. Dr Wyver noted that the FCO had circulated to other departments its own guidance to staff on contacts with PMCs. She would be interested to hear what action other departments had since taken, and to receive copies of any guidelines drawn up by other Departments (since received from MoD). She suggested that Departments might consult the PMC Group before entering into contracts with companies in this sector, in order to benefit from the experience of others. 12. Mr Fraser Darling said that in the security sector it was crucial to know the names of the individuals involved. The boundaries between companies were often very fluid. In drawing up a contract it was important to ask who owned the company, who worked for it and who sat on the Board of Directors. If a company dodged answering these questions, that was in itself grounds for suspicion. The information could then be fed into the database, and HMG would build up, over time, a clearer picture as to who could and who could not be trusted. Mr Fletcher asked whether the guidance on contacts with PMCs should also apply to mine clearance contracts. Dr Wyver said that this would be advisable. Mr Fraser Darling noted that demining workers had been implicated in covert intelligence activities in Kosovo. Other 13. Ms Davison noted, for the record, that Task International had consulted LACD about a request from the Colombian government for them to deliver training in security sector work. A CTPD sponsored visit was also about to visit Colombia to advise on crisis management in kidnap situations. This might give rise to contract opportunities for UK firms. 14. There was a brief discussion of Chechnya, and allegations that British citizens were going to Chechnya to fight, inspired by religious convictions. But there was general agreement that this did not come within the PMC Group's remit. Our focus should be on the commercial provision of military services. ACTION POINTS All Departments: to seek Departmental legal advice on the proposed database and wherever they would be able to provide information. To report on the legal advice they have received at the next meeting of the Group. @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA All Departments: to nominate two representatives, one of whom will normally attend meetings of the PMC Group. To ensure that representatives have a minimum of STRAP 2 security clearance. UND, FCO: to ask JIC to include a reporting requirement on PMCs. UND, FCO: to seek FCO consent for reporting telegrams to be automatically fed into the database. @@ AAA Those Present Dr Wendy Wyver, UND, FCO (Tel: 270-3838 Fax: 270-3753) Mr John Andrews, DDI CPAC, DIS, MOD (Tel: 2188-1092 Fax: 2188-9917) Mr John Firmin, D1 1GT, MoD (Tel: 2188-5641 Fax: 2188-9917) Ms Liz Hebden, G3W/1, Security Service (Tel: 2188-5461) Ms Cathy Gilhespy, Head Enforcement Unit XNP (Tel: 215-8399 Fax: 215-4325) Mr Roger Sanbrook, Criminal & Enforcement Policy, HMC&E (Tel: 865-5161 Fax: 865-4961) Mr Karl Livingstone, CHAD, DFID (Tel: 917-0056 Fax: 917-0502) Mr Barry Fletcher, HQ Sy(S&T)1d, MoD (Tel: 0171-218-5998 Fax: 0171-218-9078) Mr David Heard, Room L/3104, GCHQ (Tel: 01242-221491 x 3849 Brent: 01242-259012) Mr R F Darling, Box 850, WLD(VC), FCO (Tel: 0171-270-3800 Fax: 0171-270-0736) Mr Nicholas O'Brien, Anti-Terrorism Operations, MPSB (Tel: 230-3377) Mr Phil Batson, Africa Command, FCO (Tel: 270-4022) Mr Alastair Totty, NEAPD, FCO (Tel: 270-3263) Ms Georgina Butler, LACD, FCO (Tel: 270-2479) Ms Nicole Davison, LACD, FCO (Tel: 270-2608) ************************************************* Additional Text Section ************************************************* ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und27 Action Taken: PA Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 05/07/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und22 Action Taken: PA Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 02/02/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: Distribution list: @(:@): Action Officer(s): und22 und27 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT STATUS CHANGED FROM DRAFT TO FINAL 00:55 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:55 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:25 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:23 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 17:20 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 30/12/1999 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 17:01 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 30/12/1999 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 16:58 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 30/12/1999 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 15:39 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 30/12/1999 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 15:24 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 30/12/1999 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und18 Action Taken: FINAL DOCUMENT REGISTERED 00:55 Action Protective Marking: CONFIDENTIAL Action Caveats: Action Date: 15/01/2000 [.RE10][.RE11] Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:55 Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:25 Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:23 Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 17:20 Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 17:01 Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 16:58 Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 15:39 Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 15:24 Created by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 14:06 (C) 1996-97 Centreline 2000 TUDOR - Licensed to end user Foreign and Commonwealth Office Document Conversion Number 207236 of 1000000 licensed CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY